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Abstract. Modeling the competition among telecommunication opera-
tors (or providers) as a repeated game may explain why tacit collusion
to maintain high charging prices can be observed. Such outcomes clearly
do not beneﬁt the users, nor do they provide operators with incentives
to improve the network quality of service to outperform their competi-
tors. We propose a simple regulation based on price stability over time,
to modify the game played by operators in a way that could prevent
collusion.
Keywords: Competition, Game theory, Repeated games.
1 Introduction
Competition in the telecom sector has been hard since liberalization, being char-
acterized by a number of subsequent market twists (booms and downturns),
resulting e.g. in a ﬂurry of new operators followed by market concentration pe-
riods [1]. Due to the asymmetry existing between the incumbent operator and
the new entrants, these have been forced to move boldly to gain market shares.
Though competitors could use several leverages, telecom providers have typically
acted on prices, sometimes engaging in a price war, where a price reduction by a
provider is immediately followed by similar price reductions by its competitors,
spurring a downward spiral [2]. Price wars are generally considered to be quite
harmful for providers in the long term, since they cut the revenues of all the com-
petitors despite the demand increase [3]. Instead, customers largely beneﬁt from
the general reduction of prices, as long as the beneﬁt of expense reduction is not
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accompanied by worsening quality of service [4]. However, Chamberlin showed
that, in a scenario with a limited number of competitors, oligopolistic coordina-
tion is likely to occur, resulting in the joint maximization of proﬁts rather than
a price war [5,6]. Cases of collusion (explicit or tacit) have been reported in the
literature, both in the long distance market [7] and in the mobile sector [8] [9].
In this paper we analyse the game resulting from the competition between
providers and the strategies leading to price war or collusion. Though the analysis
of competition is generally dealt with in a static setting, a customer is continually
confronted with the task of choosing the best provider, even on a call by call basis.
Hence we consider here the competition between providers as a repeated game,
where providers may continually update their prices to regain lost customers.
The time aspect makes competition on prices diﬀerent from a one-shot game. We
show that a solution strategy in the repeated game leads to tacit collusion, hence
to the prices resulting from the joint maximization of proﬁts. We then propose
imposing price stability as a regulation tool to prevent joint proﬁt maximization
from being a Nash equilibrium of the game and we also show that it can be
eﬀective to deter providers from tacit collusion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the demand model and
the competition game that is repeatedly played between two providers, high-
lighting two possible outcomes of that game (the noncooperative and the coop-
erative ones). In Section 3, we recall the main results on repeated game theory
and show how a repeated game model is well-suited to our problem, thereby
leading to collusion among providers as an equilibrium. Section 4 proposes a
regulatory measure based on price stability, and Section 5 investigates its eﬀect
when both providers are identical (symmetric game). Some asymmetric exam-
ples are studied in Section 6 to illustrate some particularities of the game and
the proposed regulation. Conclusions and directions for future work are given in
Section 7.
2 Demand Model and Competition Game among
Providers
In this paper we focus on the case of two providers. We introduce in this section
the dependence of provider demands with the prices they set, and present the
game played between the competing providers seeking to maximize their proﬁt.
Assumption 1. Following [10], we consider the following demand model where
demand at each provider depends on all providers’ prices. Demand Di at provider
i ∈ {1, 2} is given by
D1 = D0,1 − b1p1 + β1p2 (1)
D2 = D0,2 − b2p2 + β2p1 (2)
where D0,i is the demand level if prices were set to zero, bi > 0 represents the
negative eﬀect of provider i’s price on his demand, and βi > 0 the positive eﬀect
of the concurrent’s price.
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Remark that the expressions in (1)-(2) can give negative demands for some
values of the parameters. However for the cases we will consider (namely, non-
cooperative and cooperative situations among providers), the demand for each
provider will be nonnegative.
It is also assumed that a uniform price increase by any ﬁrm cannot produce
a total demand increase, implying b1 ≥ β2 and b2 ≥ β1. Moreover, we expect
the direct eﬀect of price bi on demand Di to be strictly larger than the indirect
eﬀect of the competitor’s price βi. We summarize those conditions below
∀i = j,
{
bi > βi
bi ≥ βj . (3)
The utilities of the providers are given by their revenues, i.e. the products
price×demand :
U1(p1, p2) = p1D1 = p1(D0,1 − b1p1 + β1p2) (4)
U2(p1, p2) = p2D2 = p2(D0,2 − b2p2 + β2p1). (5)
Investigating the best response of provider 1, we can see that ∂U1/∂p1 = D0,1−
2b1p1 + β1p2, and a maximum is obtained at p1 = (D0,1 + β1p2)/(2b1) > 0.
Similarly, the best response for provider 2 in function of provider 1’s price p1 is
p2 = (D0,2 + β2p1)/(2b2) > 0. A Nash equilibrium (if any) is therefore a point
satisfying those two equations. The system has a unique solution
(pN1 , p
N
2 ) =
(
2b2D0,1 + β1D0,2
4b1b2 − β1β2 ,
2b1D0,2 + β2D0,1
4b1b2 − β1β2
)
. (6)
Remark that those prices are positive since 4b1b2 > β1β2 from (3).
The corresponding utility values at the Nash equilibrium are denoted by UN1
and UN2 , and given by
UN1 = b1
(
2b2D0,1 + β1D0,2
4b1b2 − β1β2
)2
UN2 = b2
(
2b1D0,2 + β2D0,1
4b1b2 − β1β2
)2
.
If we are now interested in the cooperative case where both providers try to max-
imize the sum of their utilities. U(p1, p2) = U1(p1, p2) + U2(p1, p2) = p1(D0,1 −
b1p1+β1p2)+p2(D0,2− b2p2+β2p1), the maximum is obtained when ∂U/∂p1 =
∂U/∂p2 = 0, i.e., D0,1−2b1p1+β1p2+p2β2 = 0 and p1β1+D0,2−2b2p2+β2p1 = 0.
It yields
p∗1 =
2b2D0,1 + (β1 + β2)D0,2
4b1b2 − (β1 + β2)2
p∗2 =
2b1D0,2 + (β1 + β2)D0,1
4b1b2 − (β1 + β2)2 .
We can verify that under (3), those prices are positive, as well as the correspond-
ing revenue for each provider.
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Remark 1. Notice that competition actually leads to a price reduction with re-
spect to the cooperative setting. The ratio indeed gives
pN1
p∗1
=
4b1b2 − (β1 + β2)2
4b1b2 − β1β2
2b2D0,1 + β1D0,2
2b2D0,1 + (β1 + β2)D0,2
,
which is in the interval (0, 1) since both terms in the product are.
Similarly, we can also show that pN2 < p
∗
2, therefore from the user point of view
the noncooperative situation is preferable.
3 Competition as a Repeated Game
One of the aims of opening the telecommunication market and allowing sev-
eral providers was to induce competition that would be beneﬁcial for the end
users. Indeed, with the possibility of losing customers, providers are incentivized
to improve their quality of service, and minimize their costs so as to propose
attractive prices to users, in order to retain them or attract new customers.
That pricing aspect is illustrated in the previous section: if the two providers
play noncooperatively (i.e. under competition), then the prices set are lower
than if providers are actually owned by the same entity and maximize the sum
of their revenues. Here, competition intends to make providers play a so-called
”prisoner’s dilemma” game [11], with a unique Nash equilibrium that does not
optimize the sum of their revenues: providers have interest in cooperating so as
to maximize that sum [5], but then the temptation to cheat (i.e., decrease one’s
price to attract more customers) is very strong.
The providers being trapped in lowering prices results in beneﬁts to users,
and in that sense is a socially desirable outcome. A possible way to quantify
the performance of an outcome is the total amount of demand that is served,
that is the number of users that ﬁnd the price of the service low enough and
subscribe. In that sense, the Nash outcome of the pricing game outperforms the
joint-maximization one: from (1)-(2) the sum of the demands D1 + D2 is
D1 + D2 = D0,1 + D0,2 − (b1 − β2)p1 − (b2 − β1)p2,
which is nonincreasing in both prices from (3). Since we saw in Remark 1 that
pNi < p
∗
i for each provider i, then total demand with Nash prices is larger than
with joint revenue maximization prices.
However, the pricing game described in the previous section does not take
into account the time aspect: the game among providers is not played only once,
but over several time periods (days, months or years). In general, user demand
does not immediately adapt to prices, because switching providers may take
time. However, users may choose their provider only for a speciﬁc service session
(say, to connect to a WiFi hotspot). In that case, it is reasonable to assume
that there is no delay in user reaction to provider price changes. In this paper,
we consider that framework, and therefore assume that at each time period the
same game is repeated. In such a case, joint-maximization, that we interpret as
collusion among providers, may indeed occur despite the incentives to behave
non-cooperatively in the one-shot game. Fisher [12] summarizes that issue:
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The study of any real oligopoly has largely become the study of how the
joint-optimization solution is or is not achieved and the reasons why.[...]
Tacit collusion is only made possible by the fact that the game, or games
like it, will be played again.
A provider strategy in the repeated game is now a function that at each time
period, associates an action (or a distribution over the possible actions) to the
one-shot game strategies that have been played so far1. That set of previously
played strategies is called the history of the game. Morerover, at each time
period the players could make their action choice also dependent on some public
signal, i.e. they can play correlated strategies [14]. We will not explicitly use such
correlated strategies, so we do not enter the details here.
Provider i’s utility for the repeated game is now deﬁned as the sum of the
utilities that he obtained at each time period, where a per-period discount factor
δ ≤ 1 is used to compare gains obtained at diﬀerent times. Consequently, if we
denote by st the set of strategies for the one-shot game that are played at time
t, the normalized2 expected utility of provider i is
Vi = (1− δ)
+∞∑
t=0
δtUi(st). (7)
The discount factor represents the “patience” of the players: the smaller it is,
the more players value present gains against future ones. That factor δ can have
diﬀerent interpretations:
– it can represent the price in the current period of a monetary unit in the
next period: if a per-period interest rate r > 0 is applied, then this gives
δ = 11+r .
– Independently of interest rates, the factor δ can also stand for the probability
of the game continuing at next period. Indeed, especially in telecommuni-
cation networks, the rapid evolution of technologies and services may lead
to some services being abandoned by customers, consequently ending the
competition game among providers.
– The most realistic interpretation is to consider that δ represents both of
those aspects, and could for example be expressed as
δ =
1
1 + r
P(game continues at next period).
3.1 General Results on Repeated Games
In this subsection, we recall the main existing results on repeated games that
are related to our problem. We particularly focus on diﬀerent versions of the
1 Remark that in general, mixed strategies are not directly observable, since only
actions are observed. Nevertheless the general results given in the next section also
hold when only actions are observed [13].
2 We add the multiplicative constant (1−δ), so that the sum in (7) gives the weighted
mean of the player utilities over time periods, with weight δt for period t.
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so-called Folk Theorem, that investigates the possible outcomes of a repeated
game. Consider a game with N players, that is repeated over time periods. For
the simple game, the set of actions of each player i is Ai, and we represent the
actions of all players as a vector a := (a1, ..., aN ) ∈
∏N
i=1 Ai where ai ∈ Ai is the
action of player i.
We denote by Umini the minimax utility of player i, i.e. the minimal utility
that he can ensure when the other players try to minimize i’s utility:
Umini := min
a−i∈A−i
max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai, a−i),
where a−i (resp. A−i) stands for the actions (resp. set of possible actions) of
players diﬀerent from i, and we write the overall action vector as a = (ai, a−i).
Consequently, Umini is the worst utility that i can ensure if he knows the actions
of his opponents. It can also be interpreted as the worst utility that the other
players can impose on player i, and the corresponding strategies that they play
to do so are called the minimax strategies against player i.
We also denote by U the set of “reachable” utility vectors of the simple game,
i.e.
U := {(U1(a), . . . , UN (a)) : a ∈
N∏
i=1
Ai}
The basic version of the Folk Theorem is as follows.
Theorem 1 (The Folk Theorem). For any (v1, ..., vN ) in the convex hull of
U, such that vi > Umini , if δ is suﬃciently close to 1 then there exists a Nash
equilibrium of the inﬁnitely repeated game where, for all i, Vi = vi.
The proof is simple: the utility vector (v1, ..., vN ) is reachable via a (correlated)
strategy vector (s1, ..., sN ) (see for example [15] for a proof). The Nash strategies
consist in each player i playing si while everybody does, and if a player j deviates
then all other players should minimize his utility forever, playing the minimax
strategy against j.
However, in repeated games the notion of Nash equilibrium might not be
strong enough: for example the previously described Nash strategies impose each
player to sanction the ﬁrst deviator forever, although this might be costly to
them. Therefore, there might be no incentive to sanction the deviators. As a
result, for a potential deviator the threat of being sanctioned might not be
credible, and the deviator can reasonably expect that he will not be sanctioned.
For that reason, we use the stronger equilibrium concept of perfect (or sub-
game perfect) Nash equilibrium. A perfect Nash equilibrium strategy should be
a Nash strategy for any subgame of the game, i.e. in any situation that can be
attained. Therefore, if there exists a perfect Nash equilibrium implying sanc-
tions, then it includes incentives for the sanctioning players to actually perform
the sanctions.
Below we give three versions of the Folk Theorem involving perfect equilibria,
with diﬀerent hypotheses.
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Theorem 2 (Aumann-Shapley [16]/Rubinstein [17]). If δ = 1 then the
Folk Theorem holds with perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 3 (Friedman [18]). For all v = (v1, ..., vN ) in the convex hull of
U, if vi > Ui(aN ) where aN is a Nash equilibrium of the simple game, then if δ
is suﬃciently close to 1, there exists a perfect Nash equilibrium of the inﬁnitely
repeated game where, for all i, Vi = vi.
Theorem 4 (Fudenberg and Maskin [13]). With two players, the Folk The-
orem holds with perfect equilibrium. Moreover, for more than three players, if the
convex hull V ∗ of the reachable utility vectors dominating the minimax utilities
is of dimensionality N , then for any (v1, ..., vN ) ∈ V ∗, if δ is suﬃciently close to
1 then there exists a perfect equilibrium of the inﬁnitely repeated game in which
player i’s average payoﬀ is vi.
The proofs for those results are built the same way: the perfect equilibrium
strategy consists of playing at each period the same strategy that gives utility
vector v until someone deviates, and following a sanction procedure against the
ﬁrst deviator. The constraint of the equilibrium being perfect makes the sanction
procedure more complex than for the classical version of the Folk Theorem. We
do not enter the details of those strategies in this paper.
3.2 Implications for Our Problem
If we consider that the only pure strategies available to the providers are the Nash
and joint-maximization prices exhibited in Section 2, then the one-shot game is
a somehow classical prisoner’s dilemma game, where the minimax sanctioning
strategies are actually the Nash strategies of the one-shot game. Since it is not
likely that absolutely no discounting occurs, Theorem 2 does not apply. However,
it is actually realistic that the per-period discount rate be very close to 1, because
interest rates are low and/or periods are short. Therefore Folk Theorem versions
in Theorems 3 and 4 apply to our model.
In particular, we focus on the particular outcome of the repeated game corre-
sponding to tacit collusion between providers, i.e. the joint-maximization prices.
Both Theorems 3 and 4 imply that if the parameter δ is suﬃciently close to 1,
then providers playing joint-maximization prices at each period is a subgame-
perfect Nash outcome of the repeated game. This is undesirable from the point
of view of users, since it means competition does not play its role in terms of
price reduction.
If δ is large enough, it is very likely that the joint-maximization outcome is
the Nash equilibrium that occurs among the inﬁnity of possible perfect Nash
equilibria. In the rest of the paper, we therefore look for ways to prevent such
tacit collusion between the providers, by using regulatory tools.
4 Imposing Price Stability to Prevent Collusions
We propose here to build a regulation tool that would prevent joint-maximizing
prices frombeing a perfectNash equilibriumof the game playedbetween providers.
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To do so, the regulation that is applied needs to modify the game perceived by
providers, so that the hypotheses of Theorems 3 and 4 do not hold anymore. Both
theorem assumptions (as well as the classical Folk Theorem) involve a δ that is
suﬃciently close to 1, so those theorems do not apply anymore if we manage to re-
duce the value of δ. The value of δ is not chosen by the regulator, but is a ﬁxed value
perceived by providers, that cannot be aﬀected by regulator’s decision. However,
the regulatorymeasure that we propose has an eﬀect that is equivalent to reducing
the value of δ when δ < 1.
We suggest that the regulator imposes some stability in the provider price
decisions. More precisely, providers should be allowed to modify their price every
k periods instead of every period, where k is the stability constraint over time,
ﬁxed by the regulator. This can be written formally as follows: for each provider
i and each m ∈ N we impose price stability for a duration of k periods, i.e.
akm+ = akm ∀m ∈ N, i = 1, ..., N,  < k. (8)
Now rewrite the objective function (overall utility) of each player i:
Vi = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtUi(at)
= (1− δ)
∞∑
m=0
δkm
k−1∑
=0
δUi(akm+)
= (1− δ)
k−1∑
=0
δ
∞∑
m=0
δkmUi(akm)
= (1− δk)
∞∑
m=0
(δk)mUi(akm),
where the third line comes from (8). We ﬁnd the same expression as in (7), but
with δk instead of δ as the discount factor.
As a result, the price stability measure has the same eﬀect on providers as a
change of δ into δk, since the repeated game strategies only aﬀect the actions at
time periods (km)m∈N. Therefore, if δ < 1, then the provider’s “new perceived
value” of the discount factor can be made as close to 0 as needed, through an
appropriate choice of k. Notice however that introducing too much rigidity will
be badly perceived by providers3, so k should be chosen just large enough to
prevent tacit collusion, as we will see next.
In what follows, we will keep the same notation for δ to designate the perceived
discount factor, but we now consider the value of δ as a strategic variable for
the regulator (who can reduce the original value of δ to δk).
3 On the contrary, end users may prefer such price stability to fast time-varying tariﬀs.
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5 Study of the Symmetric Competition Game
We study here our regulatory proposition, in the case when the game is perfectly
symmetric. Moreover, we impose a condition on the relative values of the direct
and indirect price inﬂuence factors, i.e. respectively, the bi and βi in (1) and (2).
Assumption 2. We consider the linear demand model described in (1)-(2), and
assume that both providers are identical:
D0,1 = D0,2, b1 = b2, β1 = β2.
Let us denote by D0, b and β those common values for D0,i, bi and βi,
respectively.
Moreover, assume that the inﬂuence factor β of one provider’s price over the
demand of his opponent is suﬃciently low with respect to the direct inﬂuence
over his own demand, more precisely
β <
2
3
b. (9)
In that case, the game that is repeated has symmetric Nash prices
pN1 = p
N
2 =
D0
2b− β := p
N ,
leading to provider revenues
UN1 = U
N
2 = b
(
D0
2b− β
)2
:= UN .
On the other hand, joint-maximizing prices are
p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
D0
2b− 2β := p
∗,
and the corresponding provider revenues are
U∗1 = U
∗
2 =
D20
4(b− β) .
We have p∗ > pN as proved before in the general case.
We now assume that providers only have the choice between playing price pN
or p∗. In cases when one provider plays pN and the other p∗, the one playing the
Nash price gets revenue
U1(pN , p∗) = U2(p∗, pN ) = D20
2b2 + β2 − 2bβ
(2b− 2β)(2b− β)2 ,
while the opponent gets revenue
U2(pN , p∗) = U1(p∗, pN ) = D20
2b2 − 3bβ
(2b− β)(2b − 2β)2 .
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pN p∗
(0, 0)
(
β2
2b(b−β) ,− β
2
(2b−2β)2
)
(
− β2
(2b−2β)2 ,
β2
2b(b−β)
) (
β2
4b(b−β) ,
β2
4b(b−β)
)
pN
p∗
Fig. 1. The one-shot competition game among symmetric providers (under Assump-
tion 2), with relative utilities X = (U − UN )/UN . Lines and columns represent the
strategic choices of provider 1 and 2, while the values in the table are of the form
(X1,X2).
We normalize the revenues at those outcomes through the linear transfor-
mation X = (U − UN )/UN . The results therefore give relative revenue values
with respect to the Nash equilibrium utilities of the one-shot game. They are
summarized in Figure 1.
Interestingly, the relative (with respect to the one-shot game Nash equilib-
rium) provider utilities depend only on the price sensitivities b and β, regardless
of the value of D0. Therefore, to study the game and set an appropriate value
for the price stability duration, the regulator only needs to evaluate those sensi-
tivities, and the per-period discount factor δ.
Moreover, notice that β
2
(2b−2β)2 >
β2
4b(b−β) whenever β < b, so that we can
write
β2
(2b− 2β)2 = (1 + α)
β2
4b(b− β)
with α > 0.
We simplify again the writing of game without changing the relative prefer-
ence of providers, by dividing all utilities by the constant factor β
2
4b(b−β) . That
normalization of utilities yields the game depicted in Figure 2.
We can then apply Theorem 3 to the one-shot game depicted in Figure 2. If
δ is large enough, joint-maximization can be attained by the following perfect
Nash strategy for each provider.
pN p∗
(0, 0) (2,−1− α)
(−1− α, 2) (1, 1)
pN
p∗
Fig. 2. Simpliﬁed writing of the one-shot competition game among symmetric providers
(under Assumption 2)
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– Play p∗ while both do,
– If one provider deviates, then play pN forever.
This is a Nash equilibrium if the sanction in future periods for being in the
situation (pN , pN) instead of (p∗, p∗) exceeds the immediate gain for deviating.
The sanction in future periods equals (1 − 0) × ∑∞m=1 δm = δ/(1 − δ)), while
the immediate gain for a deviator is 2 − 1 = 1, therefore if δ/(1 − δ) > 1,
or equivalently δ > 1/2, then the strategy described before is a perfect Nash
strategy.
On the contrary, if δ < 1/2 then no outcome other than (pN , pN ) can be
sustained as a perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. Indeed, any point
(U1, U2) in the convex hull of U deﬁned in Subsection 3.1 is such that U1+U2 ≤ 2,
therefore necessarily at least one of the two providers expects an average weighted
revenue less than 1 at a perfect Nash equilibrium. Consequently for that provider,
switching from pN to p∗ represents an immediate gain larger than 1, and a total
future sanction lower than δ/(1−δ) < 1, which implies that he will always prefer
playing pN . Anticipating that, the competitor will also play pN .
Recall that δ is actually close to 1 in real situations, but we can artiﬁcially
reduce it through the price stability regulation policy explained before. For the
game we are studying, if we choose a “price stability period” k such that δk < 1/2
then no collusion should occur. We therefore have a threshold on the stability
period k to prevent collision from occurring as a (perfect) Nash equilibrium of
the repeated game.
Proposition 1. Consider a repeated competition game between two identical
providers. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, then the high-prices situation (p∗, p∗)
can be attained as a Nash equilibrium of the regulated repeated game between
providers if and only if the price stability duration k is such that δk ≥ 1/2.
On the contrary, if δk < 1/2, then the only Nash equilibrium of the regulated
repeated game is for each provider to play pN at each period.
If we consider a quite stable technology, i.e. we neglect the probability that the
technology be abandoned at the next time period, then the value of δ should
be determined by the interest rate r, that we can take close to 5% per year to
ﬁx ideas. This would give a per year discount factor of δ = 11+r = 0.95. With
such a value, remark that the price stability period imposed by the regulator
should be of the order of k = 15 years so that the “regulated” discount factor
δk become lower than 1/2. Such a rigidity imposed by the regulator is much too
strong to be acceptable4, implying that for a perfectly symmetric game between
providers, the regulation method we are suggesting cannot be applied to prevent
collusion. However, we will see next in Subsection 6.2 that regulating through
the imposition of a reasonable price stability can be eﬃcient to elicit providers
to actually play the competition game instead of colluding.
4 We assume that a reasonable price stability period should be less than one year, or
two at most.
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6 Some Numerical Examples
In this section, we point out two speciﬁc examples where the game is not sym-
metric, that highlight diﬀerent phenomena.
6.1 Joint-Maximization Is Not Always Beneﬁcial to Both Providers
Consider the situation where (D0,1, D0,2) = (1, 2), that can be interpreted as
provider 2 being able to reach more customers (e.g. through a more extended
coverage region). Then it can also seem realistic to consider that the price eﬀects
modeled by bi and βi, i = 1, 2, are also proportional to the covered population
since only it can be aﬀected by price changes. We take here the case where bi =
2βi = αD0,i with a strictly positive constant α. Remark that α has no inﬂuence
over normalized utilities, since it just depends on the price unit chosen; likewise,
the inﬂuence on absolute utilities (revenues) is only through a multiplicative
constant and does not aﬀect the analysis of the game.
We give in Figure 3 the absolute utility values for the one-shot game with
α = 1. Interestingly, while the price proﬁle (p∗1, p
∗
2) maximizes the sum of the
pN2 p
∗
2
(0.44, 0.88) (0.54, 0.72)
(0.14, 1.25) (0.38, 1.25)
pN1
p∗1
Fig. 3. Provider utilities when (D0,1, D0,2) = (3, 4) and bi = 2βi = D0,i, i = 1, 2
provider revenues, we remark that provider 1 would prefer the proﬁle (pN1 , p
N
2 ) in
terms of its own revenue. Therefore the collaborative price proﬁle (p∗1, p∗2) is not
sustainable as a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. Possibly other kinds of
collusions could occur, but they would imply some cycles in price strategies (e.g.
provider 1 agrees to play p∗1, in the exchange for provider 2 to tolerate a period
where (pN1 , p
∗
2) later on), or mixed pricing strategies. Both possibilities are not
realistic outcomes for a telecommunication market, where frequent price changes
are badly perceived by customers. Therefore in such situations, the most likely
outcome is that providers play at each time period the Nash equilibrium prices
of the one-shot game, i.e. no collusion occurs.
6.2 A Limited Regulation Period May Be Suﬃcient to Prevent
Collusions
Consider the same situation as in the previous subsection, but where the asym-
metry between providers is less marked. We assume that (D0,1, D0,2) = (3, 4),
and still consider that bi = 2βi = αD0,i with α > 0.
The absolute (for the case α = 1) and normalized provider utilities for the
four outcomes of the one-shot game are given in Figure 4 and 5, respectively.
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pN2 p
∗
2
(1.33, 1.78) (1.63, 1.42)
(0.86, 2.30) (1.34, 2.18)
pN1
p∗1
Fig. 4. Provider utilities when (D0,1, D0,2) = (3, 4) and bi = 2βi = D0,i, i = 1, 2
pN2 p
∗
2
(0, 0) (64.45,−0.87)
(−101.76, 1.29) (1, 1)
pN1
p∗1
Fig. 5. Normalized utilities when (D0,1,D0,2) = (3, 4) and bi = 2βi = αD0,i, i = 1, 2
We remark in Figure 4 that the gain of collusion is quite low for provider 1
(less than 1% utility improvement) with respect to the noncooperative outcome
(pN1 , p
N
2 ), while it represents a revenue increase of more than 20% for provider 2.
On the other hand, the incentive to cheat is strong for provider 1. Consequently,
the collusion outcome (p∗1, p
∗
2) can only be sustained if the immediate gain to
provider of playing pN1 instead of p∗1 is lower than the loss in the remaining time
periods. From Figure 5, this means that collusion can occur only if (64.45−1) ≤
δk
1−δk , or equivalently δ
k ≥ 63.4564.45 = 0.9845 if providers are allowed to change
prices every k time periods. Remark that provider 2 is much more incentivized
to keep on collaborating with his competitor, since the gain from collusion is
large, and the temptation to cheat is quite low.
We assume that the game can be played on a monthly basis. Under that
assumption, the probability that the technology be abandoned the period after
is very low in general, while the interest rate can be reasonably taken of the order
of 0.5% per month. Therefore, a monthly discount factor of δ = 11+0.005 = 0.995
is reasonable. From the reasoning above, such a discount factor is suﬃciently
high to sustain collusion. But we also remark that the regulatory method based
on price stability manages to prevent collusion as soon as prices have to be ﬁxed
for 4 months.
Therefore in that situation, the regulation method we are considering in this
paper can be eﬀective against provider collusion, with a limited ﬂexibility re-
striction imposed on providers.
7 Conclusions
We have proposed to model competition between telecommunication service
providers as a repeated noncooperative game, in order to understand some tacit
collusion phenomena that have been recently observed in practice. We have re-
marked that the time aspects allows providers to build credible threats to each
262 P. Maille´, M. Naldi, and B. Tuﬃn
other so as to maintain high prices, even if each provider could improve its
short-term revenue by a price decrease.
A simple regulation tool imposing some price stability could make the sanction
threat between providers less eﬃcient, and could thereby in some cases prevent
high price situations to occur as a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game.
However, for some other cases (like when the game is perfectly symmetric),
only a prohibitively long price stability period could be eﬃcient against collusion.
Some other regulation mechanisms need thus be found to make competition
beneﬁt to users in those cases.
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